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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 51Abstract
This paper studies the effects of monetary policy on the investment behaviour of
various categories of Italian firms, using a panel from the Company Accounts Data
Service  (Centrale dei  Bilanci).  The exercise aims to shed light on the quantitative
importance of a channel of transmission operating through balance sheets. Financial
variables matter  (when defined as either cash flow or the stock of liquidity); small firms
and firms which have a larger share of assets that cannot be used as collateral are more
affected by monetary policy. In quantitative terms, the difference in the response of
investment by different types of firms turns out not to be negligible; however, the
implications of this finding for transmission asymmetries across euro-area countries
should not be  overemphasized. Our main policy conclusion is that monitoring the
financial conditions of different types of firms is important in order to assess the overall
monetary stance.
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The paper studies the effect of monetary policy on the investment decisions of Italian firms. It
aims to shed light on the quantitative importance of a channel of transmission operating through
firms’ balance sheets, as well as on heterogeneity in policy transmission.
According to the “credit channel” view of monetary transmission, firms more affected by in-
formation asymmetries or having less collateral face a higher cost of external finance and may be
subject to liquidity constraints. Monetary policy would be transmitted to these firms not only
through a traditional “interest rate” channel, but also through the tightness of financial constraints,
as higher interest rates affect the cash flow and the price of collateral assets.
The existence of a “credit channel” may be relevant to euro-area policymakers in two re-
spects. The financial conditions of firms in the euro area (changes in balance sheets and availability
of internal finance), both at the aggregate and the disaggregate level, should be monitored in order
to assess the current monetary stance more accurately. In addition, structural differences among the
euro area countries (as firms’ size or firms’ indebtedness) may determine cross-country transmis-
sion asymmetries.
In the first part of the paper, we  estimate the elasticity of investment to the user cost of capi-
tal (the interest rate channel) and to financial variables (cash flow, the stock of liquidity); we exploit
a panel of 7,026 firms over 1984-1999, from the Company Accounts Data Service (Centrale dei
Bilanci). We reconstruct the user cost of capital at firm level. We test the hypothesis that firms more
subject to information asymmetries are also more subject to financial constraints.
The results are consistent with the existence of a “credit channel” operating through balance
sheets:
  Both the user cost of capital and financial variables affect the investment decisions;
  the impact of financial variables is significantly stronger for small firms. It is also stronger
for firms who have a larger share of intangible assets (R&D investment, patents), which
are of difficult evaluation and cannot be used as collateral.
In the second part of the paper, we assess the quantitative effect of monetary policy, on differ-
ent firms and through the different channels. We complement the previous results with macroeco-
nomic links among policy rates and the main determinants of investment. The results indicate that:
  most of the total effect of monetary policy is transmitted through the user cost (about 65
percent). However, the effect transmitted through the cash flow is also non negligible;
  monetary policy has a larger effect on the investment by small firms;
  however, the differences in the GDP response to monetary policy between Italy and the
euro area that would derive from a mechanical extrapolation of these results are quite lim-
ited.
The existence of a balance sheet channel of transmission, particularly if confirmed for other
euro-area countries, would suggest that monitoring the financial conditions of firms may improve
the assessment of the monetary stance. In contrast, while transmission asymmetries could exist
across euro-area countries as a result of a balance sheet channel, they are not likely to be so large as
to be systematically relevant.
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1
How does monetary policy affect the investment decisions of Italian firms? Does its
effect vary according to firms’ characteristics? The question is not new, but up to now it
has been only indirectly addressed using micro data. This paper presents a first set of
results obtained from a panel of Italian firms. The exercise aims to shed light on the
possible existence and on the quantitative importance of effects of monetary policy
through firms’ balance sheets, as well as on asymmetries in policy transmission. The
results may have implications for euro-area monetary policy.
In the debate on the features of monetary policy transmission in the euro area, a
common claim is that recourse to micro data is necessary since the macro evidence is
ambiguous. The claim has been advanced, among others, by  Guiso  et al. (2000). It is
commonly believed that the use of micro data presents two advantages. First, exploiting
cross-sectional variability may help to overcome the identification problems that affect the
estimation of monetary policy effects at the macro level. For instance, exogenous cross-
sectional variations in taxation may help estimating the response of investment to changes
in the price of capital (Cummins,  Hassett and  Hubbard, 1994). Second, the existing
structural differences among the euro-area countries (the size of firms, the size and
number of banks, the degree of bank dependence, the features of the financial system) are
usually regarded as the main argument for the existence of transmission asymmetries
(Kashyap and Stein, 1997; Dornbusch, Giavazzi and Favero, 1998; Favero and Giavazzi,
1999). In this respect, it is important to test empirically which types of microeconomic
heterogeneity are important at the country level.
Among the factors that may determine differences in monetary transmission are
those linked to the “broad credit channel” view of monetary transmission. According to
this view, owing to information asymmetries, “opaque” firms face a higher cost of
external finance and are subject to liquidity constraints. The model developed by
                                                                
1 This research is part of a co-ordinated project conducted within the Monetary Policy Transmission
Network of the Eurosystem. We thank Stefania De  Mitri for invaluable research assistance and Ulf  von
Kalckreuth for extensive discussions of previous versions of this paper. We are also indebted to Jean Bernard
Chatelain, Anil Kashyap, Daniele Terlizzese, Philip Vermeulen and all the participants in the Network for
comments and suggestions on previous versions of this paper, to  Libero  Monteforte for running the
simulations of the quarterly model and to Alessandra  Staderini for providing insights on the Italian tax
legislation. The usual disclaimer applies. Correspondence should be addressed to
gaiotti.eugenio@insedia.interbusiness.it or generale.andrea@insedia.interbusiness.it .
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interest rate are transmitted not only through the resulting increase in the user cost of
capital (the neoclassical channel of transmission), but also through the exacerbation of
financial constraints: an increase in policy rates is reflected in larger interest payments,
hence a worsening of the firm’s cash flow, and in a decrease in the value of assets that
could be used as collateral for new loans. Furthermore, the macroeconomic impact of
monetary policy on sales can affect investment decisions both directly (as sales enter the
neoclassical demand for capital) and through their effect on the cash flow.
  Several
characteristics of firms that differ across countries in the euro area have been assumed a
priori to affect the potency of monetary policy by tightening the financial constraints: size,
level of indebtedness, maturity structure of debt, availability of collateral.
The possible existence of “broad credit channel” effects may thus be relevant to
euro-area policymakers in two respects. In an extreme case, the differences in firms’
characteristics across countries may determine systematic asymmetries in policy
transmission so large that the area-wide policymaker cannot realistically ignore them.
Favero and Giavazzi (1999) stress that, while the regional impact is usually not at the
centre of the monetary policy debate, an uneven distribution of the effects of monetary
policy may make the management of a single monetary policy more difficult, since
countries are largely the frame of reference in EMU. More generally, if monetary policy is
found to be transmitted through changes in balance sheets and in internal finance, the
euro-area policymaker would be well advised to keep a close watch on the financial
conditions of firms in the area, both at the aggregate and disaggregate level.
Against this background, a number of issues are relevant to identifying the
dimensions in which “broad credit channel” effects and transmission asymmetries may
arise. Is the change in the user cost of capital the main determinant of investment (does the
neoclassical model hold?), and, if so, is the elasticity different across types of firms?  Are
financial variables relevant and, again, do they affect different firms in different ways?
Are other factors at work, e. g. through the effect of monetary policy on the demand for
the firm’s output, which may also contribute to generating transmission asymmetries
across sectors of the economy?
2. Monetary policy and investment decisions in Italy: the existing evidence
The existing evidence on the link between monetary policy and investment
decisions in Italy was mainly obtained at the macroeconomic level. The quarterly model
of the Italian economy (Banca d’Italia, 1986) features a demand for capital based on a
ECB • Working Paper No 110 • December 2001  7standard CES production function; the demand for capital is affected by its user cost,
which in turn depends on the interest rate. In Banca d’Italia (1986), the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labour was estimated to be 0.9; in later versions of the
model, it was constrained to be equal to one, assuming a Cobb-Douglas production
function. Taking into account all the interactions in the model, a one percentage point
increase in the interest rate has a negative impact on non residential investment of the
order of 2-3 percentage points each year (for about six years: Nicoletti Altimari  et al.,
1995). Other studies conducted at the macro level also rely on the assumption of a Cobb-
Douglas production function (e. g. Parigi and Siviero, 2000).
At firm level, the Italian literature, following the international mainstream, focuses
on the effect of financial constraints on investment behaviour; the role of financial
constraints in the investment function is investigated to spot the existence of information
asymmetries and the working of a “broad” credit channel. Surveys of the international
debate and of the methodological issues are in  Chirinko (1993) and  Hubbard (1998).
Different dynamic specifications of the investment function (accelerator specification,
formulation based on  Tobin’s Q, Euler equation)
2 have been estimated, testing whether
financial constraints significantly enter the equation and whether they differently affect
groups of firms with particular characteristics related to the existence of information
asymmetries. For Italy, a common finding is that financial variables affect investment for
particular groups of firms. Galeotti, Schiantarelli and Jaramillo (1991), using a Q model
on a sample from the Company Accounts Data Service (Centrale dei Bilanci), find that
cash flow is a determinant of investment for small firms but not for large ones.
Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (2000) estimate an accelerator model and find that firms
belonging to large and medium-sized business groups are less sensitive to the availability
of cash flow, confirming the crucial role that internal finance plays for solo firms. Bianco
(1997) estimates a Euler equation and finds that Italian firms’ investment decisions are
affected by the availability of internal funds, measured by the cash flow; the effect is
stronger for small firms. She also finds that firms that have a stable relationship with a
bank are less responsive to financial constraints. More recently, Bagliano and Sembenelli
(2001) study the effects of the recession of the early 1990s on inventory investment, using
micro data from Italian, French and British firms. They find a strongly pro-cyclical
behaviour of inventories and a significant effect of financial factors (leverage) on
inventory behaviour; they also find that for small and young Italian firms the leverage
effect on inventories is larger.
                                                                
2 A brief discussion of the various specifications is in section  4.
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policy’s impact on different classes of firms. For a more precise assessment of that impact,
two alternative directions can be pursued. The effect of the user cost of capital, which
depends on interest rates, can be explicitly included in the estimated investment functions
based on panel data. Alternatively, the effect of monetary policy measures on the activity
of different size classes of firms can be directly estimated using time-series methods;
however, this is only possible when long time series for classes of firms are available,
which is not always the case.
Including the user cost in investment equations.  In most empirical work based on
panel data, the user cost of capital is not included in investment functions. It is assumed to
be the same for all firms (it is a transformation of the interest rate), and its effect is
accounted for by the time dummies. While this approach makes it possible to obtain a
consistent estimation of the remaining parameters, it sheds no light on the effect of
monetary policy. Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999) construct a firm-specific measure of
the user cost of capital. While still using a single interest rate for all industries and assets
in their sample, they differentiate across firms using information on asset-specific
purchase prices, output prices for every industry, investment tax credit and depreciation
allowances for each asset, and asset-specific depreciation rates. They find elasticity to the
user cost of the order of -0.25, much smaller than would be implied by a Cobb-Douglas
production function. Alternatively,  Ber,  Blass and  Yosha (2000), in order to estimate
directly the effect of monetary policy on firm-level investment, proxy the user cost of
capital with the short-term rate and omit time dummies from the regression. However, this
approach can result in biased estimates and is particularly problematic if the time
dimension of the sample is limited. For Italy, we are aware of no company-level estimates
of the elasticity of investment to the user cost of capital.
Directly estimating the effect of monetary policy on classes of firms. The effect of
monetary transmission was also addressed using time-series data for different size classes
of firms. In order to follow this approach, the time series should be of a reasonable length.
For the US, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) use quarterly data from the Quarterly Financial
Report for Manufacturing Corporations, available for different size classes. For Italy,
Rondi et al. (1998) use annual data for a closed sample of private companies collected by
Mediobanca from 1968 to 1991. They define episodes of monetary tightness using a
qualitative dummy, regress various balance sheet items on the policy indicator and also
estimate investment and sales equations for groups of firms, including the short-term
interest rate among the explanatory variables. They find that, following a tightening, small
firms report a steeper fall in sales and inventory. They also find that fixed investment
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monetary tightening.  However, they do not find a significant role for the interest rate in a
fixed investment equation based on time-series data for the different size classes of firms.
Other approaches are based on a combination of micro and macro evidence or on
descriptive analysis. Dedola and Lippi (2000) estimate the effects of monetary policy on
different industrial sectors of five countries by means of a VAR, then explain the cross-
industry differences in terms of characteristics of each sector derived form micro data.
They find a significant role for output durability, investment intensity and measures of
firms’ borrowing capacity (size and interest burden).  Guiso  et al. (2000) discuss in a
descriptive way the importance of several characteristics in explaining the Italian firms’
response to the 1992 monetary tightening and the 1993 recession. They find that size and
export orientation matter in this respect.
Our analysis of a sample of Italian firms aims at filling some of the gaps in the
existing literature. We ask the following questions.
3
How large is the response of investment to the user cost of capital, and is it different
across groups of firms? As mentioned, not much evidence on this issue is now available
for Italy. We try to answer by constructing firm-specific measures of the user cost for our
panel. In principle, differences in user cost elasticity should only reflect technology and
substitution possibilities. In practice, however, the estimate is likely to capture other
monetary policy effects not adequately controlled by the introduction of other variables (e.
g. credit rationing and financing constraints not completely captured by the inclusion of
financial variables in the regressions). If the neoclassical model of investment does not
work for firms facing financial constraints, this will show up in particular variables
entering the regression (financial variables, interest rate spreads: see, for instance, the
discussion in Gertler, Hubbard and  Kashyap 1991); however, such a finding could be
reinforced by the existence of differences in the estimated effects of the user cost across
firms with certain characteristics. The groups of firms that we analyse (discussed in detail
in section 6) are those for which different effects of monetary policy can be expected, on
the basis of credit channel effects.
Does the cash flow affect investment decisions, and is this effect different across
groups of firms? A significant effect of financial variables for “opaque” firms may reflect
                                                                
3 Rosolia and Torrini (2001) have followed a parallel and complementary line of research, estimating
investment equations for large and small manufacturing firms, using the same database we use. They do not
focus on the issue of the effects of monetary policy; however, they reach results on the link between
investment decisions and financial conditions quite consistent with ours.
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itself to prove the presence of financial constraints (it may be a measure of profit
expectations); however, differences in cash flow coefficients across particular groups may
be more easily interpreted in that way.
4  As mentioned, for Italy there is already a
reasonable body of evidence, suggesting that financial constraints do matter for some
categories of firms. However, a joint estimation of the effects of the cash flow and of the
user cost has not been performed.  Chirinko,  Fazzari and Meyer (1999) show that
interactions between the two variables can affect the estimates. Since the cash flow and
the firm-specific user cost are correlated by construction (see the Appendix), in order to
reach robust conclusions it is important to include a measure of the user cost in the
regression.
How does monetary policy affect the user cost, the cash flow and sales (the main
explanatory variables in investment equations) and are there quantitatively significant
differences in these effects across groups of firms?  This issue is virtually unexplored. Yet,
an answer is essential to a full understanding of the effects of monetary policy, as this is
obviously the first link of the transmission process. Moreover, although we do not directly
tackle this issue, this could also be a possible source of asymmetries. For instance, close
bank-customer relationships may smooth the effect of changes in policy rates on the cost
of credit for some categories of firms, thereby attenuating the impact of monetary policy
on investment irrespective of the user-cost elasticity of investment. It has been argued that
this may be particularly important for small firms and small banks in Italy.
5 The same
argument applies to the effect of monetary policy on cash flow. In turn, sales are an
important determinant of investment, and they are affected by monetary policy in a way
that may depend on the interest-sensitivity of the demand for the firm’s output. Fazzari
(1993) goes so far as to argue that, for the US, too much emphasis is usually placed on the
cost-of-capital channel of transmission of policy to investment, and that greater weight
should be placed instead on changes in the level of economic activity and on the financial
conditions of the corporate sector.
From a methodological standpoint, our analysis is in two steps. First, we estimate
the elasticity to the user cost and to financial variables obtained from an investment
function, both for the whole sample and for groups of firms that are assumed to be more
“opaque”, hence more subject to financial constraints (section 6). Second (section 7), we
                                                                
4 Using the cash stock, instead of cash flow, as a measure of financial constraints can supply a further
robustness check (see sections 4 and 6).
5 Some evidence on a weaker “bank lending channel” for small banks owing to customer relationship in
Italy is provided by Angeloni et al. (1995).
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economy to evaluate the effect of monetary policy on the main determinants of investment
demand (the user cost, the cash flow, sales) and consequently on different types of firms.
This allows us to assess the relative importance of various transmission channels, as well
as the quantitative importance of asymmetric effects, both domestically and in an
international comparison.
Before turning to the econometrics, the main  stylized facts on the reaction of
different groups of firms to monetary restriction are set out in section 3, the main
specifications for investment functions used in the literature reviewed in section 4, and the
features of the dataset we employ discussed in section 5.
3. Italian firms' investment, cash flow and monetary episodes: some stylised facts
Guiso et al. (2000) conduct a descriptive analysis of the behaviour of Italian firms
during the 1992-93 recession. As they note, the limit of a descriptive approach is that it is
hard to disentangle monetary shocks from real shocks; it is also difficult to control for
different factors affecting the reaction of groups of firms to the business cycle.
Nonetheless, the stylised facts in episodes of monetary restriction are a useful reference
for the econometric analysis.
Tables 1 and 2 present the main balance sheet items for the sample of non-financial
firms included in the Italian Company Accounts Data Service (Centrale dei Bilanci) (see
Appendix), whose database contains information on the profit and loss account and
balance sheet for some 35,000 non-financial firms from 1982 to 1999, for a total of
590,000 observations. In the tables, we distinguish firms according to size (small and
large) and sector (manufacturing, services and commerce).
The sample shows a substantial heterogeneity among firms of different sizes.
According to the descriptive statistics, size seems to affect the exposure to financial
constraints, as small firms are more leveraged, more dependent on banks and on short-
term debt, and have a smaller cash flow and heavier interest burden. Table 2 shows
average statistics for the years 1997-98. For small firms, leverage was 57 per cent in the
manufacturing sector and 62 per cent in services and commerce. Bank loans were around
25 per cent of total liabilities, as opposed to between 14 and 19 per cent for large firms;
the proportion of short-term debt was also higher (74 per cent of total bank debt,
compared with about 50 per cent for large firms). Debt securities, which made up less than
ECB • Working Paper No 110 • December 2001 122 per cent of total liabilities for the sample as a whole, accounted for less than 1 per cent
for small firms.
Higher levels of leverage impact on interest expense: in 1997-98 these were 2.8 per
cent of total assets for small firms, 2.3 per cent for larger manufacturing firms, 2.0 per
cent for larger commercial and services firms. Cash flow was also lower for small firms,
and in particular, for those operating in the services sector. Gross investment as a
percentage of total assets was lower for small firms; however, in the manufacturing sector
this gap tended to close in recent years.
An anecdotal look at the main episodes of monetary restriction in the last two
decades indicates some regularities: after a tightening, cash flow and investment
decreased, although with varying lags; the decrease was usually more pronounced for
small firms.
In the period 1982-1999 the Italian economy experienced three recessions (the end
of the 1980-82 episode, 1992-93 and 1996)
6 and  three main episodes of monetary
restriction (1986-87, 1992 and 1994-95).
7
The 1986-87 monetary restriction was aimed at countering tensions in the foreign
exchange market. Despite a temporary tightening of liquidity conditions and a rise in very
short-term rates, however, bank lending rates continued to come down through most of
1987, reflecting the fall in inflation, the continued effect of the lifting of credit controls in
the early 1980s and increased competition in the banking market. The downward trend of
nominal rates halted, and was partly reversed, at the end of 1987. The upward trend of the
cash flow/assets ratio and of the investment/assets ratio came to a halt at the same time
(Figure 1). In 1989, monetary policy was again temporarily tightened and the average
lending rate started to rise. In the following two years, investment and cash flow fell as a
percentage of total assets.
The contraction in the investment/assets ratio was initially stronger for smaller
firms (Table 3 and Figure 2). In particular, in 1989 the increase in interest rates hit firms
characterised by a higher ratio of short-term debt to total assets (i. e. mainly small
companies), causing a contraction in cash flow and investment, whereas for larger firms
                                                                
6 The precise chronology of recession periods proposed by Altissimo, Marchetti and Oneto (2000) is
1980:3-1983:3, 1992:3-1993:7, 1995:11-1996:11.
7  See Gaiotti (1999). The major restriction at the beginning of the 1980s is not included because it
mostly falls outside our sample. There were also other instances of monetary tightening in the 1980s, notably
in 1989; these are, however, less straightforward to interpret, often representing only a temporary reaction to
the dynamics of the exchange rate or money growth.
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every category of firm.
The monetary restriction of 1992 was particularly severe, aimed at countering the
turbulence in the European Monetary System and, after the devaluation of the lira in
September, the threat of imported inflation. The repo rate (the Bank of Italy’s main policy
rate) rose by an average of more than 2 percentage points with respect to 1991, with an
increase of more than 6 percentage points at peak; the average lending rate increased by
1.7 percentage points year on year. The decrease in the cash flow/assets ratio was
particularly severe during the recession, as firms' interest expense went up to 5 per cent of
total assets (from 4.3 per cent in 1990-91), absorbing 30 per cent of gross income. Gross
investment declined. The investment/asset ratio remained low in the subsequent 1994-95
expansion.
In 1992-93, the cash flow/assets ratio of small firms in services and commerce
(which had been  characterized by higher operating profits and lower leverage)
deteriorated much more than did that of large firms in the same sectors (Table 3). On the
whole, the contraction in the investment/asset ratio was less pronounced for large
manufacturing firms than for firms operating in services and commerce, probably owing
to the asymmetric effects of the currency devaluation.
8
The reduction in interest rates beginning in mid-1993 contributed to a marked
decrease in interest expense and to an increase in the cash flow/assets ratio;
9 the latter rose
of more than 1.5 percentage points between 1993 and 1994.
Monetary policy tightened again in 1995, and the growth in the cash flow ratio
declined and then turned negative during the 1996 recession. In 1996 the
investment/assets ratio for the whole sample kept growing: the effect of the recession was
partly offset by monetary easing beginning in 1996 and by the ensuing reduction in
interest expense.
In 1996 investment over total assets generally fell for small manufacturing firms,
while cash flow over total assets also contracted for large firms. For large manufacturing
firms, the effects of the monetary restriction may have again been counterbalanced by the
sharp weakening of the exchange rate.
                                                                
8  Guiso et al. (2000) note that ''due to the combination of the sharp devaluation (which greatly benefited
export-oriented firms) and the tight fiscal policy (which heavily affected firms with a domestic market), the
recession and the subsequent recovery were unevenly distributed.''
9 A contribution also came from the decrease in leverage brought about by the low level of investment.
ECB • Working Paper No 110 • December 2001 144. The specification
A large body of theoretical and empirical literature analyzes the determinants of
investment. Virtually all empirical models obtain the optimal capital/output ratio from the
solution of the firms’ profit  maximization problem, yielding a desired capital stock
positively related to output and negatively to the user cost of capital; the latter is the cost
incurred by using capital, due to interest expense, depreciation, price level changes and
fiscal factors (a standard definition is in the Appendix).
(1) t i t i t i uc y k , 1 , 0 , a a + =
where ki,t is (the log of) the capital stock, yi,t can be (the log of) either sales or output and
uci,t is a measure of (the log of) the user cost of capital.
Dynamics are then added in different ways (either “implicitly” or “explicitly”, by
modifying the optimization problem: Chirinko, 1993). Bond et al. (1997) review the most
common empirical specifications: the accelerator, the error correction model and the Euler
equation.
10 In this paper we will concentrate on the “implicit dynamics” specifications, i.
e. the accelerator and the error correction models. The accelerator specification has the
form:
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where i stands for the firm , t is a time index,  1 , , - t i t i K I is investment over the capital
stock, dt is a time-specific effect, hi is a firm-specific effect. Equation (1) can be derived
from the equilibrium condition for the desired capital stock, assuming that investment is a
distributed lag of the change in the desired capital stock, considering that
i t i t i t i k K I d + D @ - , 1 , , , where di is the depreciation rate.
The error correction model can be obtained from the same equation for the desired
capital stock, assuming a partial adjustment mechanism. As pointed out by Bond  et al.
(1997), it allows information on the levels of output and the capital stock to be retained,
thus ensuring convergence of the current stock of capital to a long run value. The model
is:
                                                                
10 They do not consider the Q model of investment (see Chirinko, 1993), which is also widely used in
empirical work as it is usually implemented for listed companies. It can be used for unlisted firms only if the
discounted sum of profits can be estimated from the data.
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Both specifications raise several issues.
11 First, the way in which the user cost is
measured. As mentioned, the most widely used solution is to simply assume that the user
cost is common to all firms (ucit = uct) and let time dummies take into account its time
variations. This is unsatisfactory for our purposes, since we aim precisely at estimating the
effect of interest rate movements on investment. As mentioned in section 2, two different
strategies are possible. The effects of monetary policy can be modelled in two steps:
constructing firm-specific proxies of the user cost of capital to estimate (2) and (3), along
the lines of Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999); then, separately estimating the impact of
a measure of monetary policy on the user cost of capital. Alternatively, one can directly
use a measure of the monetary policy stance as a regressor in (2) and (3), omitting the time
dummies; in this case it is again ucit =  uct, common to all firms in the same year. We
follow the first approach. As a measure of monetary policy, we use the Bank of Italy repo
rate, which is commonly adopted as a monetary policy indicator in the applied literature
(for a discussion, see  Gaiotti, 1999).
 Another issue regards the role of financial variables. Information asymmetries can
cause a departure from the model underlying (2) and (3). Distinguishing the behaviour of
firms characterized by different degrees of financial constraint is crucial to understanding
the transmission of monetary policy. The common approach is to add financial variables,
namely cash flow or profits, to the right-hand side of (2) and (3). The estimated
coefficients have been interpreted as reflecting the presence of financial constraints on
investment, due to some information asymmetries or market imperfections conducive to a
“broad” credit channel. However, the interpretation proved to be ambiguous (see the
debate in Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1997 and Kaplan and Zingales, 1999 and 2000,
as well as the surveys in  Hubbard, 1998 and  Schiantarelli, 1995); in the presence of
adjustment costs, current investment depends on expected future profits, which may be
correlated to current cash flow. The latter may be a proxy for expected profits rather than
financial constraints.
                                                                
11 A third and widely used specification is the Euler equation derived from the first order conditions of
the profit maximization problem, under the assumption of quadratic costs of adjustment, so yielding explicit
dynamics (see Bond  et al., 1997). Given the way it is derived, it embodies a consistent treatment of
expectations and makes it possible to overcome the ambiguity in the interpretation of the possible finding of a
significant effect of a cash flow (or profit) term added to equation (2) or (3). However, subsequent analyses
have led to scepticism towards the ad hoc assumptions (e.g. the form of the adjustment cost) needed to
implement the estimation. Some contributions (Chatelain and Teurlai, 2000, Whited, 1998) discuss possible
ways out of this problem. At the present stage, though, we prefer to concentrate the analysis on the simpler
specifications (2) and (3) above.
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assess the effects of monetary policy. We control for the cash flow/capital ratio in
estimating (1) and (2), but also test whether the cash flow has a significant differential
impact for groups of firms that can be thought as being characterized by different degrees
of informational asymmetries. We also test whether the results are robust to the
introduction of the stock of cash, instead of cash flow, as a financial variable. While not
completely free from interpretation difficulties, the former indicator is likely to be much
less correlated  with expected profits.
12
The investment equations above do not capture the first link in the monetary policy
transmission chain, i. e. the effect of monetary policy on the main variables in the
equation: the user cost, cash flow, sales. The impact of monetary policy can be felt
through each of the three variables (Bernanke, Gertler and  Gilchrist, 1996). The relative
importance of each variable in policy transmission is an open question, which may also
have implications for the importance of asymmetries. The last part of the exercise
investigates the dynamic relation between a monetary policy indicator, the user cost, the
cash flow and sales.
5. Data
To conduct our empirical analysis we selected a sub-sample of firms from the
Company Accounts Data Service’s database described above. The first two years of the
sample were discarded, in order to construct the stock of capital at replacement value and
to calculate the I/K ratio (where investment in year t is divided by capital at t-1): this left
us with 550,000 observations. This definition of the  I/K ratio also had the effect of
excluding the first year in which each firm entered the sample, leaving us with 383,500
observations. Furthermore, we selected the firms for which information to construct the
user cost (i. e. fiscal data) was available, retaining 195,000 observations for the period
1984-1999. After trimming for  outliers (see the Appendix for details), imposing the
condition of firms being continuously present for at least six years, and leaving out of the
regressions the first five years, since the model is in first differences and we have lags in
our specification, our final sample for estimation is composed of 7,026 firms and 43,912
observations.
                                                                
12 Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) report such a finding for the US.
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illustrated in detail in the Appendix. An important feature is the user cost of capital, which
is constructed at firm level, using sector-specific depreciation rates and prices of output
and investment and taking into account the influence of fiscal factors.
13
We measure the interest rate at firm level as the ratio of interest expense over
financial debt (“apparent” interest rate).
14 This approach allows us to obtain a firm-
specific interest rate, but introduces a possible bias since the rate we obtain is an average
rate, not a marginal rate, whereas the latter should be relevant for the firms’ decisions.
However, the distinction may be of small importance for Italian firms, as most of the debt
is either short-term (according to Table 2, debt with a maturity of less than one year is
about 60 per cent of total debt for all firms) or at a floating rate. In the Appendix, we show
that in our sample the behaviour of firms’ interest expense is consistent with a rather high
elasticity of the firm-specific debt rate to the policy interest rate, between 0.6 and 0.8.
 The summary statistics of the final sample are presented in Table 4. The
investment/capital and cash flow/capital ratios have a positively skewed distribution. Sales
growth is larger for smaller firms. The within-firm standard deviation in Table 4, which
measures the variability of each variable across time (cross-sectional variations are
eliminated by subtracting the firm mean), is quite high for sales growth; by contrast, the
investment/capital and cash flow/capital ratios are less volatile. The last column reports
the coefficient of firm-specific time variation (see Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer, 1999),
which varies between 0 and 1 and indicates the proportion of time variation in each
variable that cannot be explained by aggregate time effects.
15 For investment, cash flow
and sales the coefficient is close to one, indicating that most time variation is firm
specific, i. e. it is not explained by aggregate time effects. The coefficient is smaller for
                                                                
13 For a complete description of the methodology used to calculate the user cost of capital for Italian
firms, see De Mitri, Marchetti and Staderini (1998). They show that the introduction of the tax on net worth
was one of the determinants of the increase in the user cost at the beginning of the 90s. Later, other fiscal
reforms had opposite effects.  The Tremonti Law (1994-96) provided substantial tax incentives for firms with
historically high investment rates; the estimated reduction in the user cost was 10 per cent in 1994, 26 per cent
in 1995 and 9 in 1996. Moreover, De  Mitri,  Marchetti and  Staderini (1998) document a substantial
heterogeneity in the user cost of capital across firms located in the South and in the North of Italy; for the
former, up to 1994 the fiscal component of the user cost was lower, owing to tax  reliefs. Recently, the
introduction of the Dual Income Tax was meant to reduce the tax advantage of debt with respect to equity
finance (see Staderini, 2000).
14 De Mitri, Marchetti and Staderini (1998) use bank rates applied to individual firms, obtained from the
Central Credit Register database (which are also defined as average rates). Apart from the fact that these yields
only refer to bank lending, if we had followed their approach we would have lost a significant number of
observations due to data availability.
15 It is (1-R
2) from a regression of each variable on aggregate time dummies, after subtracting firm
means.
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16 As expected, movements in the user cost depend
largely but by no means completely on aggregate factors. The latter finding confirms the
appropriateness of choosing a measure of the user cost at firm level.
Figure 2 shows the pattern of the main variables used in the estimation, which is
broadly consistent with the discussion in section 3, although here we are using a smaller
data set and considering ratios over capital, not over total assets. Investment/capital falls
in 1992 and in 1993, recovers in 1995, and falls again in 1996, following the monetary
tightening. The cash flow/capital ratio follows a similar pattern. The user cost rises after
the 1992 restriction, falls in 1993 and rises again in 1996.
6. Empirical results
In this section we compare different specifications of the investment equations for
our sample of Italian firms.
We present results based on both the accelerator and the error correction model.
Each model is estimated using either the OLS (fixed effect) estimator or GMM first
differences. It is well known that the OLS estimator may be inconsistent, since it does not
take into account firm-specific effects (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The “within groups”
estimator applies OLS after transforming the data into deviations from firm means, in
order to eliminate the firm-specific effects. However, Nickell (1981) has shown that this
would result in downward biased estimates of the  autoregressive coefficients in panels
with a small number of time periods. GMM first differences eliminates the firm-specific
effects by differencing the equations, and then uses the lagged values of the endogenous
variables as instruments. Instruments are needed since  differencing induces serial
correlation in the residuals, which would yield inconsistent estimates when the lagged
dependent is included (a discussion is in Bond et al, 1997). However, depending on the
choice of the instruments, GMM can lead to very large standard errors of the estimated
coefficients. Hall, Mulkay and Mairesse (2000) compare GMM estimators and “within”
estimators for an investment equation and find a “quite implausible” magnitude of many
coefficients estimated by GMM. This leads them to prefer the “within” estimator when the
number of time periods is reasonable (they have 12 annual observations for each firm).
                                                                
16 These features are remarkably similar to those found by Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999) on their
sample.
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methods. While the presence of the lagged dependent variable in our specification may
determine a bias in the “within” estimator, the choice of the instruments in our GMM
estimation appears not to be unimportant.
6.1 The basic models
Table 5 compares the results from models (1) and (2) (augmented with the cash
flow/capital ratio), using both estimation methods. Most results turn out to be robust to the
choice of model and method, although the significance levels are sometimes affected.
GMM estimates are presented in column 1 (error correction model) and 2
(accelerator model). In the error correction model the total elasticity of the capital stock to
sales is estimated to be low, about 0.16 (but not significantly different from zero). The
impact of the user cost is negative and significant; the total elasticity is negative and less
than one in absolute value, equal to –0.46.
17 The effect of the cash flow is positive and
significant (about 0.13 in the first two years).
18 The accelerator model also features a
significantly negative effect of changes of the user cost on the I/K ratio (with a total
elasticity of 0.26); a positive effect of cash flow is also found. The effect of changes in
sales is about 0.13 and it is now highly significant.
The results obtained with the within group OLS estimator (columns 3 and 4)
confirm the negative impact of the user cost. In the accelerator specification the
adjustment to the user cost is similar to – or slightly lower than – that found with GMM
estimation. Cash flow matters (with a positive sign) in both cases and the sales variable is
significant.
Some robustness checks on the model specification were also performed. First of all
the ECM specification yields a higher negative coefficient for the user cost than those
obtained with the ADL model; however the coefficient obtained with GMM seems
sensitive to the choice of instruments. Results more in line with those of the ADL are
obtained (results not shown) with a slightly different set of instruments.
                                                                
17 The total elasticity is defined as the sum of the coefficients on the lags of the user cost, divided by the
coefficient on the error correction.
18 For completeness, the table also reports the total effect of the cash flow/capital ratio on the capital
stock. However, given the ad hoc nature of this term, which was not derived from explicit behavioural
assumptions, and the endogenous nature of the cash flow/capital ratio, the total effect has no meaningful
interpretation. Emphasis should be put on the short or medium-run effect.
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Since the cash flow term can partly catch the effect of higher demand, we re-ran the
regressions omitting the cash flow terms. The total effect of sales did increase in the ECM
model (but only from 0.16 to 0.30). It remained virtually unchanged in the ADL
specification.
A further check is reported in Table 6, where all models were re-estimated
replacing the cash flow with the firm’s liquidity (cash in hand and bank accounts).
Conceptually, the stock of liquidity plays the same role as the cash flow, as it is a proxy of
the degree of financial constraints affecting the firm. However, it may be less affected by
the difficulties mentioned in interpreting the sign of the cash flow coefficient, as liquidity
is less likely to be a proxy of expectations of high future activity.
19 In fact, in our sample
the correlation between lagged cash flow and sales is around 0.17, whereas it is only 0.03
between lagged liquidity and sales.
20 The model proves to be robust to the introduction of
liquidity instead of cash flow. The sign and statistical significance of the various
coefficients is not greatly affected; the degree of a firm’s liquidity does affect investment
with a positive sign; the long-run elasticity to the user cost is still less than one in absolute
value. A consequence of replacing the cash flow with liquidity is that the elasticity to sales
is now slightly larger and more precisely estimated than before.
Table 7 provides a last robustness check: the basic model is estimated including a
set of interaction coefficients that allow for separate effects for manufacturing firms, in
order to check whether their behaviour is different from the others, as could be suggested
by some of the anecdotal evidence in section 3. However, no major differences are
spotted.
All in all, the results vary across models but have some features in common. They
indicate that the magnitude of the user-cost elasticity is rather limited, and much smaller
than one, contrary to the usual assumptions of the neoclassical model, although the impact
of the user cost on investment is negative and significant. On the other hand, the cash flow
(or some other financial variable) and the behaviour of sales do matter in determining
                                                                
19 According to the results of Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) on a panel of US firms, the present value
of future cash flows is highly correlated with the present value of future marginal products of capital, while
this is not a problem when stock measures of the financial status are used.
20 As a measure of financial constraints, liquidity may have its own problems. Liquidity is the
endogenous result of a decision by the firm. If the accumulation of liquidity reacts to investment decisions, the
direction of causality may not be clear. However, unlike in the case of cash flow (which involves an ambiguity
in the interpretation of the coefficient in the equation), this is mostly a problem of estimation (simultaneity).
The latter can be addressed by the use of an appropriate set of instruments (in our case, liquidity enters the set
of instruments with a lag of at least two years).
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value less than one, the value that would be implied by a Cobb-Douglas production
function.
However, the point estimates of some coefficients are sensitive to the model
chosen. In what follows, we choose the ADL model estimated with GMM as our preferred
specification. The total effects are estimated more precisely than in the corresponding
ECM model; since the precision of the estimates is satisfactory, we prefer GMM to OLS
estimates to avoid possible biases.
6.2 Heterogeneity across firms
We adopt the ADL-GMM specification in the second column of Table 5 as a
benchmark for analyzing the different impact of monetary policy variables on various
groups of firms by interacting a group dummy with each of the coefficients. Nonetheless,
for robustness check we also run the experiment with the ECM model. We consider the
following three groups, which can proxy for the existence of financial constraints.
Small firms (with fewer than 200 employees). Small firms are traditionally
considered more subject to liquidity constraints and information asymmetries; they are
characterized by weaker balance sheets and are more opaque, so they should be more
sensitive to the effect of a monetary policy tightening. In our sample, small firms are
indeed more dependent on bank loans and on short-term debt. However, the greater
sensitivity of small firms to monetary policy can be questioned on the grounds that closer
bank-customer ties (typically more important for small firms) could mitigate the impact on
both the cost of bank debt and the availability of finance following a monetary policy
contraction.
Firms with a high proportion of intangible assets on their balance sheet  (firms
whose ratio of intangible assets to total assets is higher than 75 per cent of the distribution
in at least one year). On average, firms recorded in this group have a ratio of intangible
assets to total assets ten times greater than that for the other firms (3 per cent against 0.3
per cent). This corresponds to a ratio of intangible assets to the sum of intangible assets
and fixed assets equal to 12.4 per cent for this group, against 3 per cent for the others.
Intangible assets include R&D expenditures, patents, development and advertising costs
and similar items recorded on the assets side. Investments in these assets are typically
difficult to evaluate for outside lenders and cannot be used as collateral. As a
consequence, these firms are more exposed to the “broad credit channel” of policy
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identify firms operating in activities where intangible capital is more important, hence
more subject to information asymmetries.
Firms paying dividends (firms with non-negative  payout for the whole sample
period). This distinction has been often used in the literature. Firms not paying dividends
may have chosen to do so, exploiting all internal resources to finance investment, because
they face a high premium on the cost of external finance. In the US, the sensitivity to cash
flow of firms that distribute dividends has been found to be lower (Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen, 1999). As mentioned, however, the interpretation of this finding is ambiguous
(Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). We chose the rather restrictive definition of firms paying
non-negative dividends for the whole period in order to avoid problems encountered in the
empirical literature linked to the possibility of switching between states in which
dividends are distributed and states in which they are not ( Schiantarelli, 1995). In the
Italian case, characterized by a majority of unlisted firms, this dummy variable is meant to
describe the behaviour of firms with excess cash.
The number of total observations falling in each group and the intersections
between groups are shown in Table 8. The proportion of small firms in the total sample is
roughly the same as the proportion of small firms in the group with a high share of
intangible assets. This indicates that there is very little correlation between inclusion in the
first group and inclusion in the second group. In contrast, firms paying dividends are more
likely to be large than firms not paying dividends.
The results of the three sample splits for our benchmark ADL model are shown in
Table 9; Table 10 also reports results for the ECM model. For each regression, the second
column reports the coefficient on each variable interacted with a dummy assuming value 1
for that particular sub-group of firms, representing the differential coefficients for the
same sub-group. For information, the bottom panel of each table also reports and
compares the total effects of each explanatory variable and the across-groups difference.
However, we consider the differences in short-run effects much more informative for our
purposes than the long-run differences (particularly in the case of cash flow, the latter are
of uncertain interpretation).
21
The distinction between large and small firms appears to be relevant from the
perspective of a broad credit channel. Small firms, which should be more affected by
                                                                
21 The cash flow is introduced ad hoc into equations (2) and (3), to proxy for the effect of the lack of
liquidity on current expenditure of the firm. Given this assumption, the long-run coefficient of cash flow
implied in the solution of (2) and (3) is not easy to interpret.
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flow; for the same firms the deviations from the neoclassical model also show up in a
larger user cost coefficient.
A larger effect of the cash flow on investment is also found for firms with less
balance sheet assets to use as collateral; this is again in line with our priors, as the
availability of collateral is a means of overcoming problems of information asymmetries.
By contrast, the results for firms paying or not paying dividends do not appear to be easily
interpretable in the light of the credit channel theory (possibly implying that this
characteristic is not relevant here).
More specifically, the impact of the user cost  (as well as the overall long-run
elasticity) is always negative. It is significantly larger, in absolute value, for small firms. It
is also larger for firms with intangible assets. The short run impact of the cash flow on
investment is significantly stronger for small firms, as well as for firms with intangible
assets.
To check the results, and, in particular, to better interpret the results for the
dividends split, we re-run our model using liquidity instead of cash flows as the balance
sheet variable. The results obtained (not reported) still indicate a higher total elasticity of
investment to liquidity for firms with intangible assets and a lower one for firms paying
dividends (in this case conforming to the assumptions).
7. More on monetary policy and investment
What do the above results tell us about the importance of asymmetries in monetary
transmission stemming from a broad credit channel? Answering this requires a further
step, as we need to know how monetary policy affects the determinants of investment that
we identified in the preceding section. That is, in order to evaluate the relative importance
of different channels of transmission of monetary policy to investment, the results have to
be integrated with an estimate of the impact of changes in interest rates on the user cost of
capital, the cash flow and sales.
 22
                                                                
22 It should be noted that “asymmetries” could also be at work in the first stage of transmission, thus
reinforcing or offsetting the asymmetries that we found in the investment equation estimated in the previous
section. Knowing the importance of the different channels can shed light on this issue, too, but identifying
these effects goes well beyond the scope of this paper. Asymmetries in the transmission of policy to the user
cost and the interest burden (hence the cash flow) may exist for the firm groups examined in the first part of
the paper. Information asymmetries may determine the extent to which changes in policy rates are transferred
to firm-specific lending rates, so that “opaque” firms may again suffer more from the restriction. On the other
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estimated above with macro evidence on the first link in the transmission process,
obtained from other sources. We are thus able to compute not only the total effect of
monetary policy on investment for each group of firms, but also the portion of that effect
transmitted through each explanatory variable in the investment equation.
As a first step, we consider the results from a simulation of the quarterly model of
the Italian economy (Banca d’Italia, 1986), where policy rates were temporarily increased
by one percentage point, for two years. According to the results (reported in Table 11A),
the increase in the nominal interest rate determines an increase in the user cost of capital
23
of around 3 per cent over the same period.
24 Firms’ cash flow (as a proportion of the stock
of capital) deteriorates by about 3.4 per cent, due to the effect of higher interest rates both
on value added and on interest expense.
25 Value added (the closest equivalent to sales)
decreases by about 0.7 per cent.
As a second step, we summarize the properties of the regressions presented in the
previous section over an horizon which is relevant to our experiment. Table 11B reports
the (cumulated) response of the I/K ratio to each individual determinant of the equation,
which is approximately equal to the percentage effect on the stock of capital;
26 the effect is
computed after three years, assuming a persistent change in each of the explanatory
variables. The medium-run rather than the long-run response to these variables is relevant
to judge the effects of monetary policy, as the user cost, the cash flow/capital ratio and
sales are not permanently affected by monetary policy. The table confirms that the effect
of cash flow is larger for the two groups of firms more exposed to financial constraints;
the same is true for the effect of the user cost.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
hand, as already mentioned, smaller firms may enjoy closer customer relationships with banks and somehow
be shielded from interest rate changes. Moreover, asymmetries in the response of firms’ sales to monetary
policy may stem from an “interest rate” channel, as the interest sensitivity of the demand for the output of
firms operating in the construction or capital goods sectors may be larger (Guiso et al, 2000).
23 The definition of the user cost in the quarterly model database is basically equivalent to the one we
used (see Banca d’Italia, 1986, and Terlizzese, 1994).
24 The magnitude of this effect depends crucially on assumptions made on long-term interest rates, as
these represent a portion of the average interest rate included in the user cost formula (see definition in the
Appendix). The reported results correspond to an elasticity of about 0.3; such a small elasticity depends on the
assumption that long-term interest rates are determined by the expectation theory and that perfect foresight
holds. Thus, a  temporary shock to the short-term rate has only a limited effect on long-term rates and on the
user cost of capital.
25 In the quarterly model, cash flow is defined as value added, less labour income, less direct taxes, less
interest expense (variable autimpd in Banca d’Italia, 1986). This definition is also conceptually equivalent to
ours.
26 See equation (A13) in the Appendix.
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investment determinants and the effect on investment through micro equations. As before,
the experiment is a one-percentage point increase in policy rates for two years. In the
table, we report the cumulated effect on the investment/capital ratio (the percentage effect
on the stock of capital) after three years.
Two features of the results should be emphasized. First, most of the effect of
monetary policy is transmitted through the user cost variable. This variable explains
between 65 and 70 per cent of the total effect of monetary policy on investment. The
effect transmitted through the cash flow is also not negligible, but it is smaller. The effect
through sales is relatively small. Secondly, and not surprisingly given the results in the
previous section, the effect of monetary policy is larger for small firms and firms with a
larger share of intangible assets. The difference comes from the effects of both the user
cost and the cash flow.
In order to check whether differences are large from a policy perspective, we
express the results for the first two years of the previous simulation as percentage
deviations of investment from baseline (Table 12).
27
The table shows that, for the whole sample of firms, investment decreases by about
4 per cent in each year after the monetary restriction. The size of this effect is broadly
consistent with the properties of structural macro models of the Italian economy (although
the change is faster). However, the decrease is always larger for small firms and firms
with a larger share of intangibles. The difference between the response of investment in
large and small firms is on average 1.6 percentage points each year; the investment of
firms with a larger share of intangibles decreases by 1.3 points more than for the other
group in the second year.
From a domestic standpoint, these asymmetries are of an important magnitude
(considering that gross fixed capital in Italy grew at an average annual rate of 2.4 per cent
over the period 1985-2000, with peak annual growth of 6.7 per cent).
In principle, these asymmetries could also affect the transmission of monetary
policy in the euro area. In practice, however, they should not result in large cross-country
differences. According to Eurostat statistics on small and medium-sized enterprises, the
turnover of firms with fewer than 250 employees accounts for about 71 per cent of the
total in Italy, against 57 per cent in the euro area. Considering an investment/GDP ratio of
                                                                
27 The deviations of investment from baseline in Table 12 are approximated by dividing the effect on I/K
in the first and in the second year by the average value of I/K. See equation (A16) in the Appendix.
Finally, the two sets of results are combined together in Table 11C, which shows
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would mechanically determine a larger effect of monetary policy on Italian GDP than on
euro-area GDP, of about 0.05 percentage points in each of the two years. Although not
negligible, the difference is not very large either, particularly considering the margin of
uncertainty surrounding the effects of monetary policy on GDP. However, a proper
conclusion on this issue would require complementing our result with a cross-country
comparison, which goes beyond the scope of this paper.
8. Conclusions
The user cost of capital, the cash flow and sales all affect the investment decisions
of Italian firms. Cash flow significantly enters the investment equations even when a firm-
specific measure of the user cost is included.
All in all, a number of features of our results are consistent with the existence of a
channel of monetary transmission operating through firms’ balance sheets. Financial
constraints enter the investment equation, both when measured with cash flow and when
measured as the stock of liquidity available to the firm. Moreover, the impact of financial
variables, whatever the definition, is significantly stronger for small firms; it is also
stronger for firms who have a larger share of intangible assets, which are of difficult
evaluation and cannot be used as collateral. While each of these results, taken separately,
is subject to different interpretations, taken together they all point in the same direction.
We assessed the quantitative importance of these factors in determining differences
in the effect of monetary policy on the investment of firms with different characteristics.
We concluded that the differences are not negligible, taking as a benchmark the average
growth rate of investment. However, the differences in the GDP response to monetary
policy between Italy and the euro area that would derive from a mechanical extrapolation
of these results seem quite limited.
Thus, while transmission asymmetries could exist across euro-area countries as a
result of a balance sheet channel, they are not likely to be so large as to be systematically
relevant for the area-wide policymaker. Rather, we draw a different implication from the
existence of a balance sheet channel of transmission: the same policymaker would be well
advised to take a systematic look at financial conditions of different firms in the area, in
order to assess the current monetary stance more accurately.
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The sample
 The source of information on firms' balance sheets, profit and loss accounts and
flow of funds is the Company Accounts Data Service ( Centrale dei Bilanci). Data are
collected since 1982 from a consortium of banks; the sample is not randomly drawn since
firms enter only by borrowing from one of the banks in the consortium. Balance sheets are
reclassified in order to ensure cross-sectional comparability.
The descriptive analysis in section 3 is based on the whole sample of firms; firms
with values of the ratio of gross investment to total assets lower than the first percentile or
higher than the 99th percentile were excluded. Data for 1982 are to be interpreted with
caution, since many firms had missing data in the first year of the sample. In 1998, the
whole sample included 30,991 firms, with total assets equal to 820 € billion. Firms in the
manufacturing sector represent 50 per cent of the sample in terms of total assets; the
construction sector is excluded. As discussed by Guiso et al. (1999) the focus on the level
of borrowing in the Company Accounts Data Service skews the sample toward larger
firms.
On the basis of the last census, the total database of the Company Accounts Data
Service accounted for approximately 46 per cent of total value added of the economy.
Firms in the database accounted for 13.9 per cent of the total value added of all firms with
up to 49 employees, 80 per cent of that of firms with between 50 and 199 employees, 80.2
per cent of that of firms with between 200 and 499 employees and 87 per cent of that of
firms with more than 499 employees.
As explained in the paper, the sample selected for the estimation is composed of
7,026 firms for a total of 43,912 observations. The correction for outliers was made in the
following way. First, we deleted firm-year data when there were negative values of sales
or value added Y, total assets A, the stock of capital K, total debt B, or a missing number of
employees. Second, we excluded firm-year data that fell in the first and the 99th percentile
of any of the following ratios: investment over capital (I/K), sales over capital (Y/K), cash
flow over capital (CF/K), liquid assets over capital.
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The variables used in the estimation are defined as follows (a subscript i stands for
the firms, s for the sector, t for the time period):
Gross investment (excluding leasing): total new fixed assets.
Capital stock: the replacement value of property, plant and equipment. The














where investment in year t is deflated by a sector price of investment and the economic
depreciation rate ds is calculated at the sector level (two-digit, following ESA79). The
starting value for the first year is calculated with the formula used by Bond et al. (1997).
The first year book value is deflated using the sector price of investment measured Tmeani
years before. Tmeani is the corrected average age of the firm’s capital, which is computed
using the sector useful life of the capital goods (Tmaxs) and the share of goods already
depreciated in the first year for which the firm’s accounts are available. The formula is





































where DEPR is the total book value of accumulated depreciation.
Sales: total net sales.
Cash flow: net profit plus provisions for depreciation.
Liquidity: cash in hand and bank accounts.
Debt: total financial debt (short and long-term).
All variables are deflated using a sector-specific deflator for output prices.
                                                                
28 Equation (A2) implies that full tax depreciation is obtained in half the time of economic depreciation.
According to equation (A3), used for longer lived capital, assets are fully depreciated for tax purposes 4 years
before their full economic depreciation (the latter case is not frequent in our sample).
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I is the sectoral price of investment, ps is the sectoral price of output, ds is




t t s p p , 1 , + D  is the expected change in the sectoral price of
investment, obtained from the survey of manufacturing firms conducted each year by the
Bank of Italy (INVIND), ri,t is the interest rate (see below).
The definition (A4) also takes into account the effect of tax variables, which enter
the last term on the right-hand side.
 29
The tax rate on profits (tt), which affects the denominator (an increase in the tax
rate leads to a higher user cost), is defined at the economy-wide level.
30
The tax deductibility of depreciation charges (tt zs) reduces the cost of capital. (zs) is
the actual value of depreciation allowances per unit of investment. These are defined at
the sectoral level and determined according to Italian law, which distinguishes between
vehicles and machinery investment. Averages for each sector are computed based on the
share of these two items in investment.
31
The variable itci,t 
32 represents the investment tax credit (per unit of investment). In
1984 companies were granted a tax credit of 6 per cent of the cost of newly acquired
capital goods, which they could deduct from VAT payments.
33 Between 1994 and 1996
the Tremonti Law provided a partial tax reduction for reinvested earnings; this tax credit
                                                                
29 For details, see De Mitri, Marchetti and Staderini (1998).
30 A regional differentiation was introduced for the part of the period during which regions in the South
benefited from a lower tax rate. In 1983, the tax rate was 46 per cent in the North and 36 in the South; it
increased to a maximum of 53.2 per cent in 1995; in 1998 it was 41.25 per cent.
31 Each year a firm can deduct from income a given percentage of the historical cost of each investment
good, plus a further amount following an accelerated method. The actual values differ for vehicles and
machinery investment. Defining  ai as the depreciation in each year, as a percentage of capital, for each








1 ) 1 ( , where r is an average
interest rate.
32 We also included in this variable, treated as a negative tax credit, the effect of the introduction of the
0.75 per cent tax on companies net worth. The tax was lifted in 1998.
33 In 1984 the incentive regarded all manufacturing and extractive firms; in 1986 it was reintroduced for
Southern firms  for five more years.
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34 Until 1994 preferential treatment was granted to firms
located in the South.
Properties of the interest rate
The interest rate ri,t in (A4) is calculated at firm level using the following definition:
 (A5)
t i t i
t t i t t i t i
t i equity debt gross




















As mentioned in the text, the debt rate in (A6), while having the advantage of being
a firm-specific variable, is an average rather than a marginal rate. In the Italian context,
however, a large share of firms’ debt is either short term or at a floating rate; a change in
current rates is thus likely to be largely reflected in the average debt rate.
To check whether this applies, we estimate the relation between interest expense
and the policy rate. We assume a partial adjustment mechanism linking the debt rate to the
policy rate  t r :
(A7) 1 - t i, 1 - t t i t i, rate debt r r rate   debt g b b a + + + = 1 0
Estimation of (A7) would not be advisable, since  t r  is an aggregate variable. The
number of degrees of freedom along the time dimension would be limited in our sample
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Dividing by Kt-1 and assuming that the firm debt/capital ratio does not vary much
over time, we estimate:
                                                                
34 In each year firms were allowed to deduct from pre-tax earnings 50 per cent of their capital spending
if such expenditure for the year exceeded the average investment expenditures for the preceding five years.
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c -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.002 *
0.001 0.001 0.001
0.17 ** 0.27 ** 0.17 **
0.02 0.02 0.03








m2 3.50% 1.70% 4.50%
OLS estimation with fixed effects
1 - t i, t i K debt ,
2 - t i, t i K debt 1 , -
1 - t i, t i t K debt r , *
1 - t i, t i t K debt r , 1 * -
2 - t 1 - t K expense interest
1 - t t K expense interest
The results (for various lag lengths) are shown in the table above. In all cases, they
imply that between 60 and 80 per cent of a change in the policy rates is transmitted to the
contemporaneous debt rate. In the long run, the policy rate has a full effect on the debt
rate, as the sum of b0, b1 and g is about 1 in all regressions.
Capital, investment and the investment/capital ratio: some arithmetic
In section 7 we discussed the (short and medium-run) percentage effect of a change
in monetary policy on the stock of capital and on investment. To proxy these variables, we
used simple transformations of the deviation of the   1 - t t K I  ratio from its baseline value
(which can be directly obtained from the estimated equations).
According to a first transformation, the percentage deviation of the capital stock
from the baseline can be approximated by the cumulated sum of the deviations of
1 - t t K I , over the relevant period. This can be derived from the identity:
(A10) 1 1 - - - = - t t t t K I K K d
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 , equation (A11) can be rewritten as:
(A11) 1 1
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For reasonable values of the rate of growth of capital,  1 ~ ~ , 1 1 @ - - t t t t K K K K  (in







































which, by repeated substitution, implies that the percentage deviation of capital from the
baseline can be approximated as the cumulated sum of the deviations of  1 - t t K I .
A second approximation is used in Table 12; the deviation of investment from
baseline is derived as the deviation of  1 - t t K I , divided by the mean value of

































In the first few periods of the simulation it is  1 ~
1 1 @ - - t t K K  (this holds exactly for

































In the text, we further approximate (A15) as:





























where  K I  stands for the average  1 - t t K I  ratio over the sample.
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Table 1 Financial structure of firms
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Size of the sample
1 Total employment (x 1000) 2,578 3,068 3,180 3,283 3,225 3,151 3,200 3,277 3,329 3,397 3,280 3,415 3,551 3,474 3,528 3,610 3,360
2 Total assets (billion euro) 149 224 267 303 324 350 391 438 497 578 602 673 722 764 773 844 820
3 Total number of firms 21,589 22,488 26,447 29,694 31,747 32,435 34,050 35,690 37,195 37,224 36,813 39,038 42,535 34,669 33,074 35,178 30,991
Assets structure
(as % of total assets)
4 Total real fixed assets 27.57 36.60 33.59 32.28 31.48 30.81 29.43 29.01 30.13 32.54 32.88 32.95 32.82 31.50 32.07 30.45 30.78
5 Total financial fixed assets 6.63 5.96 6.43 6.68 7.74 7.61 8.51 8.40 8.34 8.26 8.61 11.13 9.71 9.80 10.25 11.87 12.14
6 Total inventories 21.87 16.80 17.11 17.57 16.87 16.58 16.16 16.42 16.36 15.76 15.12 13.84 14.12 14.28 13.73 13.78 13.41
7 Total trade credit 32.22 28.29 29.14 29.38 29.02 28.68 29.52 30.14 29.33 28.20 28.22 26.98 28.25 29.30 29.40 29.39 28.30
8 Total all other assets 11.71 12.35 13.73 14.09 14.90 16.32 16.39 16.03 15.83 15.24 15.18 15.11 15.11 15.12 14.54 14.50 15.38
Liabilities structure
(as % of total liabilities)
9 Loans of credit institutions 25.28 23.36 24.45 23.49 22.42 22.11 21.62 22.79 23.80 23.01 24.97 22.53 21.58 21.03 20.08 19.86 19.62
9a with maturity < 1 year 15.59 12.37 14.27 13.70 13.49 13.12 13.47 14.54 15.12 14.45 15.75 14.65 13.73 13.45 12.50 12.67 12.70
9b with maturity > 1 year 9.69 10.99 10.18 9.79 8.93 8.99 8.15 8.24 8.67 8.56 9.22 7.88 7.85 7.59 7.57 7.18 6.92
10 Debt securities 1.25 5.83 5.05 4.88 4.88 4.85 4.41 4.01 3.58 3.44 2.95 2.11 1.93 1.80 1.84 1.80 1.68
11 Trade debt 25.17 22.54 23.16 23.54 23.15 23.82 24.39 24.80 24.23 22.81 23.34 23.32 24.62 25.33 25.05 25.17 24.21
12 All other debt 8.39 6.82 6.71 6.39 6.32 5.78 6.34 6.24 6.83 7.71 8.27 11.82 9.69 8.98 9.91 9.75 9.70
13 Equity and reserves 22.92 24.90 24.05 24.52 25.94 25.81 25.00 24.81 24.68 26.25 23.63 23.28 25.13 25.03 26.19 26.72 27.47
14 All other liabilities 17.00 16.56 16.58 17.19 17.29 17.65 18.23 17.35 16.88 16.78 16.84 16.94 17.05 17.83 16.94 16.71 17.32
Flow indicators
(as % of total assets)
15 Gross investment 1.99 5.90 5.58 6.05 6.40 6.82 6.80 6.99 6.69 6.44 6.46 5.23 5.34 5.47 5.56 5.20 5.57
16 Investment in intangibles 0.13 0.36 0.37 0.41 0.49 0.47 0.53 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.74 0.52 0.58 0.52 0.66 0.61 0.69
17 Cash flow 5.84 6.45 7.76 8.24 9.07 9.42 9.43 8.83 7.86 7.48 6.39 6.18 7.72 8.19 7.97 8.34 8.72
18 Net operating profit 8.85 8.83 9.60 9.33 9.01 8.57 8.82 8.43 7.48 6.80 6.20 6.06 6.85 8.36 7.63 7.65 8.08
19 Interest and similar charges 7.12 6.93 6.33 5.70 4.66 3.91 3.88 4.00 4.23 4.26 4.99 4.96 3.63 3.85 3.38 2.77 2.30
Source: Company Accounts Data Service (Centrale dei Bilanci). Averages weighted with total assets.
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all firms small large small large
manufacturing manufacturing service service
Assets structure
(as % of total assets)
Total real fixed assets 30.62 24.13 26.12 20.98 52.61
Total financial fixed assets 12.00 6.42 17.66 7.53 12.10
Total inventories 13.60 19.24 14.10 16.96 3.98
Total trade credit 28.84 36.08 28.09 38.48 17.55
Total all other assets 14.94 14.13 14.03 16.05 13.75
Liabilities structure
(as % of total liabilities)
Loans of credit institutions 19.74 25.26 19.02 23.42 14.09
with maturity < 1 year 12.69 18.76 11.77 17.42 6.07
with maturity > 1 year 7.05 6.50 7.25 6.00 8.02
Debt securities 1.74 1.20 1.06 0.84 3.87
Trade debt 24.69 27.47 22.32 33.21 18.17
All other debt 9.73 7.41 8.70 9.09 11.20
Equity and reserves 27.09 25.56 32.27 20.04 30.12
All other liabilities 17.02 13.10 16.64 13.40 22.55
Flow indicators
(as % of total assets)
Gross investment 5.38 5.23 5.25 3.88 7.73
Cash flow 8.53 7.20 9.49 5.23 12.49
Net operating profit 7.87 7.43 8.26 6.47 9.98
Interest and similar charges 2.53 2.81 2.33 2.80 2.02
short term bank debt 64.3 74.3 61.9 74.4 43.1
leverage 53.5 57.0 47.1 62.5 49.2
Source: Company Accounts Data Service ( Centrale  dei  Bilanci). Averages 1997-98, weighted with total
assets.
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(changes in the variables with respect to the preceding period)








Average lending rate 0.70 -0.20 1.70 -1.80 0.22 -3.20
All firms
Gross investment/assets 0.19 -0.42 -0.11 -1.23 0.09 -0.18
Cash flow/assets -0.60 -1.16 -1.28 -0.21 -0.22 0.56
Interest and similar charges 0.12 0.25 0.74 -0.03 -0.47 -0.84
Small manufacturing
Gross investment/assets -0.24 -0.24 -0.49 -0.78 -0.47 -0.05
Cash flow/assets -0.71 -1.08 -1.27 -0.38 -0.39 -0.28
Interest and similar charges 0.30 0.29 0.72 -0.37 -0.36 -0.92
Large manufacturing
Gross investment/assets 0.37 -0.47 -0.09 -0.79 0.01 -0.28
Cash flow/assets -0.92 -1.95 -1.98 0.01 -0.82 0.64
Interest and similar charges 0.26 0.32 0.69 -0.11 -0.37 -0.82
Small services
Gross investment/assets -0.23 -0.06 0.27 -1.39 -0.02 0.13
Cash flow/assets -0.55 -0.63 -1.53 -0.67 0.14 -0.12
Interest and similar charges 0.15 0.26 0.94 -0.16 -0.39 -0.80
Large services
Gross investment/assets 1.13 -0.98 0.03 -2.17 0.82 -0.52
Cash flow/assets 0.04 -0.27 -0.02 -0.36 0.01 1.56
Interest and similar charges -0.41 0.14 0.58 0.15 -0.59 -0.83
Source: Company Accounts Data Service (Centrale dei Bilanci). Averages, weighted with total assets.
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Variable Mean Median Within firm  Firm-specific 
standard deviation time variation
0.119 0.073 0.139 0.986
0.022 0.025 0.664 0.964
0.178 0.135 0.159 0.969
-0.0126 -0.006 0.187 0.679
1 - t t K I
t s D
1 - t t K CF
t uc D
Source: Company Accounts Data Service (Centrale dei Bilanci). Sample period: 1989-99. I/K is investment
over capital at replacement value; Ds is the change in the logarithm of real sales; CF/K is cash flow over
capital; Duc is the change in the logarithm of the user cost. The within firm standard deviation is computed
after subtracting firm by firm means of each variable from each observation; this statistic measures the
variation over time. The firm-specific time variation is 1-R
2 from a regression of each mean  differenced
variable on time dummies. See Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999).
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Dependent variable: I(t)/K(t-1)
Sample: 1989-1999 - 7026 firms - 43912 obs.
I(t-1)/K(t-2) -0.019 0.133 ** -0.102 ** -0.019 **
(0.028) (0.027) (0.008) (0.008)
I(t-2)/K(t-3) -0.009 -0.096 **
(0.019) (0.006)
I(t-3)/K(t-4) -0.006 -0.078 **
(0.015) (0.007)
Ds(t) -0.007 0.018 0.047 ** 0.040 **
(0.032) (0.035) (0.004) (0.004)
Ds(t-1) 0.018 0.044 ** 0.058 ** 0.040 **
(0.034) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
Ds(t-2) 0.037 ** 0.030 **
(0.011) (0.004)
Ds(t-3) 0.016 ** 0.024 **
(0.005) (0.003)
(k-s)(t-2) -0.153 ** -0.204 **
(0.027) (0.006)
s(t-2) -0.129 ** -0.138 **
(0.042) (0.006)
uc(t) -0.081 ** -0.147 **
(0.027) (0.005)




Duc(t) -0.104 ** -0.124 **
(0.026) (0.004)
Duc(t-1) -0.057 * -0.081 **
(0.022) (0.004)
Duc(t-2) -0.054 * -0.051 **
(0.022) (0.004)
Duc(t-3) -0.012 -0.029 **
(0.008) (0.003)
CF(t)/K(t-1) 0.078 ** 0.273 ** 0.077 ** 0.104 **
(0.030) (0.041) (0.009) (0.011)
CF(t-1)/K(t-2) 0.069 * -0.006 0.008 0.041 **
(0.033) (0.038) (0.009) (0.009)
CF(t-2)/K(t-3) -0.051 -0.004 0.014 0.035 **
(0.027) (0.043) (0.008) (0.009)




Total effect of 0.16 0.130 ** 0.32 ** 0.112 **
sales (0.221) (0.050) (0.023) (0.010)
Total effect of -0.46 * -0.26 ** -0.65 ** -0.24 **
user cost (0.224) (0.077) (0.041) (0.012)
Total effect of 0.63 0.41 ** 0.49 ** 0.18 **
cash flow (0.360) (0.102) (0.079) (0.014)








1,24 (p=,214)  -,104(p=0,917)
142,0(p=,066)
I/K: investment over lagged capital at replacement value; uc: log of the user cost; s: log of sales; CF/K:
cash flow over capital; k: log of capital. m2 is the test of second-order autocorrelation (p-value in parenthesis);
Sargan is the test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value in parenthesis). (1) Instruments: I/K(t-2); (k-s)(t-4);
Ds(t-2 to t-6); “apparent” interest rate (t-4); CF/K (t-4 to t-5); control for time dummies. (2) Instruments: I/K
(t-2 to t-9); Ds(t-2 to t-4); Duc(t-4); CF/K (t-2); control for time and industry dummies.
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Sample: 1989-1999 - 7026 firms - 43912 obs.
I(t-1)/K(t-2) -0.001 0.162 ** -0.109 ** -0.014
0.025 0.013 0.008 0.008
I(t-2)/K(t-3) 0.014 -0.092 **
0.008 0.006
I(t-3)/K(t-4) 0.013 * -0.076 **
0.006 0.006
Ds(t) 0.079 * 0.036 0.062 ** 0.054 **
0.035 0.033 0.004 0.004
Ds(t-1) 0.104 * 0.045 ** 0.073 ** 0.055 **
0.047 0.006 0.005 0.004
Ds(t-2) 0.0298 ** 0.046 **
0.005 0.004
Ds(t-3) 0.0179 ** 0.038 **
0.005 0.004
(k-s)(t-2) -0.159 ** -0.216 **
0.022 0.006
s(t-2) -0.062   -0.136 **
0.061 0.006
uc(t) -0.067 * -0.145 **
0.027 0.005




Duc(t) -0.124 ** -0.124 **
0.037 0.004
Duc(t-1) -0.06 * -0.08 **
0.03 0.004
Duc(t-2) -0.036 -0.047 **
0.026 0.004
Duc(t-3) -0.007 -0.026 **
0.0096 0.003
Liq(t)/K(t-1) 0.064 * 0.11 ** 0.008 0.025 **
0.029 0.032 0.006 0.006
Liq(t-1)/K(t-2) -0.013 * -0.011 0.015 * 0.032 **
0.015 0.018 0.005 0.006
Liq(t-2)/K(t-3) -0.005 -0.006 0.007 0.014 *
0.007 0.007 0.005 0.006




Total effect of  0.61 0.159 ** 0.37 ** 0.163 **
sales (0.349) (0.051) (0.021) (0.009)
Total effect of  -0.18 -0.28 ** -0.60 ** -0.23 **
user cost (0.204) (0.110) (0.038) (0.012)
Total effect of  0.29 * 0.12 ** 0.14 ** 0.08 **
cash flow (0.130) (0.032) (0.041) (0.009)
Significance levels: **=1%, *=5%
GMM(1) GMM(2) Fixed Fixed
effect effect
 -,225(p=0,822)  -1,169 (p=0,242) ,944(p=0,345)  -668(p=0,504)
97,3(p=,235) 104,9(p=,228)
I/K: investment over lagged capital at replacement value; uc: log of the user cost; s: log of sales; Liq/K:
liquidity over capital; k: log of capital. m2 is the test of second-order autocorrelation (p-value in parenthesis);
Sargan is the test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value in parenthesis). (1) Instruments: I/K(t-2); (k-s)(t-4);
Ds(t-2 to t-4); “apparent” interest rate (t-4); Liq/K (t-2 to t-4); control for time and industry dummies. (2)
Instruments: I/K (t-2 to t-4); Ds(t-2 to t-4); Duc(t-4); Liq/K (t-2 to t-4); control for time dummies.
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Dependent variable: I(t)/K(t-1)
Sample: 1989-1999 - 7026 firms - 43912 obs.
dummy for dummy for
I(t-1)/K(t-2) 0.137 ** -0.011 -0.041 -0.026





Ds(t) 0.018 -0.018 0.000 0.037
(0.041) (0.058) (0.031) (0.044)
Ds(t-1) 0.024 0.021 -0.006 0.026





(k-s)(t-2) -0.143 ** -0.056
(0.037) (0.043)
s(t-2) -0.152 ** -0.0107
(0.036) (0.015)














CF(t)/K(t-1) 0.199 ** -0.021 0.063 -0.011
(0.053) (0.076) (0.042) (0.049)
CF(t-1)/K(t-2) -0.015 0.044 0.107 ** -0.053
(0.054) (0.070) (0.040) (0.055)
CF(t-2)/K(t-3) -0.031 0.047 -0.032 -0.047

















Significance levels: **=1%, *=5%
other firms(a) manufacturing(b) other firms(a) manufacturing(b)
other firms manufacturing other firms manufacturing




I/K: investment over lagged capital at replacement value; uc: log of the user cost; s: log of sales; CF/K:
cash flow over capital; k: log of capital. m2 is the test of second-order autocorrelation (p-value in parenthesis);
Sargan is the test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value in parenthesis). (1) GMM estimation. Instruments:
I/K(t-2 to t-4);  Ds(t-2 to t-4);  Duc (t-4); CF/K (t-2); control for time dummies. (2) GMM estimation.
Instruments: I/K (t-2); Ds(t-2 to t-6); (k-s)(t-4); “apparent” interest rate (t-4); CF/K (t-4 to t-5); control for time
dummies.
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(number of observations)
with high share with low share total
of intangible of intangible
assets (2) assets
small (1) 22834 16687 39521
large 1756 2635 4391
total 24591 19321 43912
paying  not total
dividend (3) paying
dividend
small (1) 505 39016 39521
large 329 4062 4391
total 834 43078 43912
with high share with low share total
of intangible of intangible
assets (2) assets
paying dividend (3) 378 456 834
not paying dividend 24213 18865 43078
total 24591 19321 43912
Number of observations falling into each group and falling simultaneously into two groups. (1) Firms
with fewer than 200 employees. (2) Firms with a ratio of intangible assets (R&D expenses, patents, developing
costs) to total assets higher than 75 per cent of the distribution in at least one year. (3) Firms with non-negative
payout for the whole period.
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Dependent variable: I(t)/K(t-1)
Sample: 1989-1999 - 7026 firms - 43912 obs.
I(t-1)/K(t-2) 0.133 ** -0.043 0.117 ** -0.048 0.026 ** -0.520 **
(0.028) (0.050) (0.029) (0.043) (0.080) (0.102)
I(t-2)/K(t-3) 0.004 -0.049 -0.008 -0.036 -0.127 * -0.480 **
(0.019) (0.034) (0.021) (0.030) (0.078) (0.101)
I(t-3)/K(t-4) -0.016 -0.010 -0.012 -0.017 -0.043 -0.076
(0.013) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024) (0.088) (0.120)
Ds(t) -0.009 0.039 0.086 ** -0.033 0.009 0.036
(0.034) (0.054) (0.029) (0.049) (0.041) (0.048)
Ds(t-1) 0.069 ** -0.016 0.056 ** 0.013 0.043 ** 0.036
(0.013) (0.020) (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) (0.031)
Ds(t-2) 0.018 0.034 0.048 ** 0.000 0.055 ** -0.036
(0.013) (0.018) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.026)
Ds(t-3) 0.009 0.006 0.024 ** -0.019 * 0.027 ** 0.006
(0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.020)
Duc(t) -0.125 ** -0.028 -0.124 ** 0.010 -0.130 ** -0.077
(0.027) (0.051) (0.030) (0.047) (0.047) (0.067)
Duc(t-1) -0.060 ** -0.043 -0.063 * -0.030 -0.091 * -0.005
(0.022) (0.044) (0.028) (0.039) (0.041) (0.065)
Duc(t-2) -0.016 -0.089 * -0.036 -0.053 -0.110 ** 0.050
(0.019) (0.041) (0.026) (0.038) (0.041) (0.072)
Duc(t-3) 0.002 -0.035 * -0.003 -0.022 -0.036 ** -0.016
(0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.027)
CF(t)/K(t-1) 0.103 * 0.142 * 0.119 * 0.145 * 0.192 ** -0.006
(0.047) (0.069) (0.054) (0.060) (0.049) (0.110)
CF(t-1)/K(t-2) 0.047 -0.009 0.019 0.043 -0.059 0.146
(0.029) (0.058) (0.034) (0.050) (0.048) (0.099)
CF(t-2)/K(t-3) 0.055 -0.043 -0.030 0.099 -0.084 0.254
(0.043) (0.068) (0.001) (0.065) (0.053) (0.130)
CF(t-3)/K(t-4) 0.075 0.103 0.102 0.094 0.089 -0.072
(0.043) (0.087) (0.058) (0.082) (0.068) (0.092)
m2
Sargan test
(a) large (b) small (a) low int. (b) high int. (a) no div. (b) div.
Total effect of sales  0.099 0.153 0.237 ** 0.174 0.117 ** 0.079
(0.053) (0.046) (0.045)
 (b)-(a) 0.054 -0.063 -0.038
(0.077) (0.067) (0.055)
Total effect of the user cost  -0.226 ** -0.402 -0.250 ** -0.320 -0.321 * -0.187
(0.076) (0.088) (0.134)
 (b)-(a) -0.175 -0.069 0.134
(0.134) (0.125) (0.153)
Total effect of the cash flow  0.319 ** 0.482 0.233 * 0.589 0.121 0.207
(0.116) (0.105) (0.125)
 (b)-(a) 0.164 0.356 * 0.087
(0.185) (0.166) (0.201)







large firms dummy for 
small firms









177,9 (p=,037) ,263,3(p=0,046) ,65,9 (p=0,978)
-0,895(p=,371)
I/K: investment over lagged capital at replacement value; uc: log of the user cost; s: log of sales; CF/K:
cash flow over capital;. m2 is the test of second-order autocorrelation (p-value in parenthesis); Sargan is the
test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value in parenthesis). GMM estimation. Instruments: Ds(t-2 to t-4); Duc
(t-4); CF/K (t-2); control for time dummies (common to all regressions); I/K(t-2 to t-4) (for large/small); I/K(t-
2 to t-9) (high/low intangibles); I/K(t-2) (dividends/no dividends).
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Dependent variable: I(t)/K(t-1)
Sample: 1989-1999 - 7026 firms - 43912 observations
I(t-1)/K(t-2) -0.014 0.033 -0.086 * 0.081 -0.022 -0.193 **
(0.024) (0.041) (0.035) (0.053) (0.028) (0.031)
Ds(t) 0.024 -0.027 0.057 -0.006 -0.003 -0.056
(0.027) (0.043) (0.034) (0.054) (0.033) (0.034)
Ds(t-1) 0.041 -0.032 0.098 * -0.014 0.018 -0.006 *
(0.034) (0.046) (0.038) (0.062) (0.035) (0.038)
(k-s)(t-2) -0.129 ** -0.058 -0.241 ** 0.079 -0.155 ** -0.172 **
(0.021) (0.039) (0.033) (0.058) (0.027) (0.030)
s(t-2) -0.121 ** -0.041 -0.134 ** 0.06 -0.131 ** -0.129 **
(0.036) (0.057) (0.051) (0.077) (0.043) (0.046)
uc(t) -0.086 ** 0.009 -0.071 * -0.007 -0.079 ** -0.091 **
(0.026) (0.039) (0.033) (0.054) (0.028) (0.029)
uc(t-1) 0.027 -0.008 0.012 -0.012 0.022 0.137 **
(0.022) (0.031) (0.027) (0.040) (0.021) (0.025)
uc(t-2) 0.053 -0.071 ** -0.001 0.011 -0.010 0.085 **
(0.019) (0.025) (0.023) (0.035) (0.017) (0.023)
CF(t)/K(t-1) -0.005 0.076 * 0.000 0.140 * 0.077 * 0.124 **
(0.031) (0.040) (0.053) (0.060) (0.031) (0.039)
CF(t-1)/K(t-2) -0.024 0.1 ** -0.019 -0.014 0.066 * -0.048
(0.025) (0.041) (0.034) (0.049) (0.032) (0.037)
CF(t-2)/K(t-3) 0.039 * -0.11 ** -0.043 ** -0.009 -0.052 0.086 **
(0.021) (0.035) (0.031) (0.048) (0.028) (0.031)
m2
Sargan test
(a) large (b) small (a) low int. (b) high int. (a) no div. (b) div.
Total effect of sales  0.062 0.134 0.444 ** 0.543 0.155 0.205
(0.251) (0.179) (0.223)
 (b)-(a) 0.072 0.099 0.050
(0.332) (0.362) (0.227)
Total effect of the user cost  -0.047 -0.406 -0.248 -0.418 -0.430 * 0.197
(0.334) (0.182) (0.220)
 (b)-(a) -0.360 -0.170 0.627 **
(0.385) (0.398) (0.230)
Total effect of the cash flow  0.078 0.406 -0.259 0.337 0.587 0.774
(0.227) (0.275) (0.354)
 (b)-(a) 0.329 0.596 0.187
(0.373) (0.694) (0.368)
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: **=1%, *=5%






large firms firms not paying 
dividends









I/K: investment over lagged capital at replacement value; uc: log of the user cost; s: log of sales; CF/K:
cash flow over capital;. m2 is the test of second-order autocorrelation (p-value in parenthesis); Sargan is the
test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value in parenthesis). GMM estimation. Instruments: I/K(t-2); (k-s)(t-4);
Ds(t-2 to t-6); “apparent” interest rate (t-4); CF/K (t-4 to t-5) (CF/K(t-2) for high/low intangibles); control for
time dummies.
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firms
A - Effect of a temporary increase in policy rates on investment determinants (1)
(percent)
Resulting change in:
User cost Value added Cash Flow/K
3.2% -0.7% -3.4%
B - Effect of investment determinants on the stock of capital (2)
(percentage points)
Effect of a 1% change in :
User cost Sales growth Cash flow/K
All firms -0.24 0.11 0.11
Large -0.23 0.09 0.06
Small -0.38 0.14 0.11
Low share of intangibles -0.24 0.21 0.05
High share of intangibles -0.31 0.18 0.13
C - Effect of a temporary increase in policy rates on the stock of capital (3)
(percentage points)
Effect due to:
Total effect User cost Sales growth Cash Flow/K
All firms -0.90 -0.59 -0.05 -0.26
Large -0.75 -0.54 -0.04 -0.17
Small -1.29 -0.95 -0.07 -0.27
Low share of intangibles -0.82 -0.59 -0.11 -0.12
High share of intangibles -1.20 -0.78 -0.09 -0.33
(1) Effect of a one percentage point increase in policy rates after two years. Simulation of the quarterly
model of the Italian economy. (2) Cumulated effect on I/K of a permanent unit increase in the log of the user
cost and sales and a permanent increase in CF/K equal to its sample mean. Simulation of the ADL investment
equations in tables 6 and 10. (3) Cumulated effect on I/K after three years of a temporary (two-year) one
percentage point increase in policy rates. Joint simulation of the macro equations and of the micro investment
equations.
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(percentage deviation from baseline)
All Large Small Low share  High share
of intangibles of intangibles
first year  -3.7 -3.5 -4.9 -3.8 -4.0
second year -3.9 -3.4 -5.3 -3.7 -5.0
Effect of a one percentage point increase in policy rates, sustained for two years. The effect on
investment is approximated by dividing the effect on  I/K   for each year (obtained from the simulation
underlying Table 11) by the average I/K ratio (see Appendix).
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Source: Company Accounts Data Service (Centrale dei Bilanci). Averages, weighted with total assets.














  I/K   cash flow/K   user cost   sales/K (right-hand scale)
Source: Company Accounts Data Service (Centrale dei Bilanci). Median value in each year of the
variables in the sample used in the regression.
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